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ABSTRACT 
Risk Analysis of Earth Dams 
by 
Jon Clair Howell, Master of Science 
Utah State University, 1980 
Major Professor: Dr. Loren R. Anderson 
Department: Geotechnical Engineering 
vii 
The purpose of this thesis is to present in a logical and 
straightforward manner, the types of probabilistic, deterministic and 
judgment methods which should be part of a risk analysis process for 
earth dam planning, design, construction and operation. In doing 
this, an attempt was made to include all of the elements (components 
of the risk analysis procedure defined herein) which were considered 
to be important. Descriptions of these elements as well as how they 
are used to estimate probabilities for the occurrence of each of three 
failure conditions (i.e. no failure, partial failure, complete fail-
ure) are also presented. Explanations are given as to how these 
failure probabilities can be used in estimating the consequences 
resulting from the failure of an earth dam. The potential use of the 
failure probabilit~es in conjunction with estimated consequences in 
decision making related to all phases of a dam project as well as land 
use planning near the dam are discussed. The possibility of performing 
a case study using the data base of Soldier Creek Dam, a project of 
the Water and Power Resources Service, is also presented. 
(93 pages) 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In most conventional structural analyses, the safety of the 
project is usually measured by means of a factor of safety against a 
particular failure mode. The question can be raised, however, as to 
the confidence which can be placed on such a factor. A-Grivas (1980) 
indicates that much literature dealing with the safety factors 
of soil structures suggests that failures have occurred with safety 
factors being greater than one, while others have shown considerable 
success even though the safety factor was less than one. Another 
limitation of the safety factor approach is that two designs which 
have identical safety factors would have very different probabilities 
of failure if the variablity in the soil properties was significantly 
different, but this is not accounted for by the conventional analysis. 
As a result of recent earth dam failures, particularly Teton Dam 
on June 5, 1976, there has been an increasing awareness of the lack of 
a comprehensive risk analysis procedure for earth dams. Risk analysis 
methods have not been used by engineers for the design of major earth 
dams. This is true largely because the general public does not like 
to think that there is any probability no matter how small, that a 
large structure such as an earth dam could fail. Also, many en~ineers 
question the accuracy of probabilities with computed values of 10-7 
or less, especially when they are based on methods using jud~ent or 
past experience. Finally, earth dams are unique in terms of founda-
tion conditions, quantity and quality of available material, 
hydrologic conditions, downstream exposure, and many other factors. 
Therefore, it is difficult to develop a rigorous, clear cut design 
method for a structure that has so many unique characteristics and 1S 
so variable with respect to quality control considerations. 
Risk assessment is a method which could be used 1n an attempt to 
determine the safety of an engineering project based on probability 
theory and reliability analysis. The idea of using risk assessment in 
civil engineering is relatively new but it is becoming more popular in 
the hope that it might be a means of overcoming the shortcomings 
associated with the conventional analysis. Several approaches 
to risk analysis in engineering projects have been proposed in recent 
years. Bowles, Anderson, and Canfield (1978) proposed a phased risk 
analysis procedure which utilizes a growing data base to determine the 
reliability of an engineering project at any time during its life. 
General risk assessment approaches have been discussed by Rowe (1977) 
where he emphasized the importance of technical and social value 
judgments relative to purely empirical scientific consideration in the 
assessment of risk. Methods have been proposed for earth dam classi-
fication by government organizations such as the Soil Conservation 
Service in an effort to evaluate the risk potential in earth dam 
projects. A handicap to the implementation of risk analysis pro-
cedures for earth dams is the lack of sound procedures for estimating 
the probabilities of various types of structural performance. One 
idea in which considerable progress has been made is probabilistic 
approaches to slope stability analysis which have been proposed by Wu 
and Kraft (1970), Matsuo and Kuroda (1974), Alonso (1976), Harr 
(1977), Vanmarcke(1977, 1979), Sharp et al. (1980) and others. 
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Purpose 
As indicated above, there is a need for more research and 
development with respect to risk analysis of earth dams. Since risk 
analysis is still in its infancy, a foundation is required on which to 
build further developments of the method in the future. As well as 
a platform for further development, this study is an effort to famil-
iarize the engineer with the general procedure of a comprehensive risk 
analysis for earth dams. In doing this, probabilistic modeling, 
empirical, and judgment procedures will be proposed to estimate the 
probabilities of various failure modes, with their corresponding 
outcomes and the ultimate consequences resulting from these failure 
modes. A discussion of the potential use of the probability and 
damage estimates in decision making related to earth dam planning, 
design, construction and operation will also be presented. 
Objectives 
The specific objectives of this study are summarized below: 
A. The establishment of an organized sequential procedure to 
estimate the probability of failure of an earth dam while taking as 
many variables into account as are considered to be important. 
1. Identification of various event-system response-outcome-
exposure-consequence pathways linking events such as a flood 
or an earthquake to consequences such as property damage 
2. Identification of existing or proposed procedures based on 
empirical, analytical, or engineering judgment approaches for 
estimating the probabilities of occurrence of: 
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a. each event 
b. each system response given that an event takes place 
c. each outcome given that a system response takes place 
d. each consequence as a function of various exposure factors 
given that an outcome takes place 
3. The evaluation of the statistical independence of the various 
probabilities identified in secondary objective 2 along with 
a proposed procedure for handling nonindependent probabilities 
4. Identification of procedures and data needs for estimating 
the consequences (e.g. dollar damages) of various exposure 
factors (e.g. time of year, dam location, flood warning 
time) 
5. Discussion of the potential use of the probability and damage 
estimates in decision making related to earth dam planning, 
design, construction, and operation (e.g. site selection, 
selection of design parameters, materials selection, quality 
control, and operating rules) 
B. The establishment of a specific framework of a detailed risk 
analysis case study of Soldier Creek Dam which should also be appli-
cable to similar structures. This will provide a basis for further 
development and refinement of this risk analysis method in the future. 
With the limited research development funds, extensive analytical work 
will not be performed on Soldier Creek Dam during this initial phase. 
The identification of the expanding data and information base for 
Soldier Creek Dam from conceptualization through construction and into 
operation will be made. 
Significance 
An advantage of the risk analysis procedure described herein is 
that the analysis can be tailored to the project's "growing data 
base." This refers to the data which is available from the init ial 
project planning through operation and maintenance. As the data base 
grows through more and more investigations, calculations, and tests, 
the confidence which can be placed on the estimated probability of 
failure increases. This thesis will outline a probabilistic method 
which is combined with several empirical and judgment procedures 
for estimating the probability of failure of an earth dam at any 
stage in its life. This analysis will utilize state of the art 
deterministic slope stability methods such as Bishop's method of 
slices and hydrologic methods for estimation of maximum probable 
floods. The probability of failure can be used to make more rational 
decisions on site selection, materials selection, quality control, 
operating rules, and for reducing risks to acceptable levels. Since 
the procedure will estimate probability of failure from the beginning 
of construction throughout the life of the project, it will be verv 
useful in making decisions at any stage before the completion of the 
project construction as well as through the rest of its life. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
Literature containing examples of methods in which statistical 
procedures were used to analyze any phase of earth dam construction 
and operation or to evaluate the overall risk analysis procedure are 
reviewed in this chapter. The review is divided into sections on 
risk analysis methods and failure mechanisms. 
Risk Analysis Methods 
General risk analysis 
Rowe (1977) defines risk assessment as the total process of 
quantifying risk and finding an acceptable level of that risk for 
an individual group or society. This is illustrated in terms of a 
hierarchy of risk assessment terminology (see Figure 1). He explains 
that risk assessment involves both risk determination and risk 
evaluation. Risk determination involves risk identification and 
risk estimation and is generally an empirical scientific activity 
performed by planners. Risk evaluation comprises risk aversion and 
risk acceptance and is a normative (political) activity. Other 
pertinent definitions are: 
1. Risk - magnitude and probability of occurrence of unwanted 
or negative outcomes of a water resources project 
2. Benefit - magnitude and probability of occurrence of desir-
able or positive outcomes of a water resources project 
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Risk referents 
Figure 1. A hierarchy of risk assessment terminology (after Rowe, 1977). 
'-.l 
3. Uncertainty - aspect of a water resources project which is 
unknown in the sense that its magnitude and probability of 
occurrence cannot be estimated with any reasonable degree of 
confidence 
Bowles, Anderson, and Canfield (1978) introduced a phased risk 
analysis approach which utilizes the growing project data base to 
determine the reliability of a given earth dam at any point in the 
project life from conception through completion and operation. They 
also adopted a risk analysis format proposed by Rowe (1977) which 
consists of a set of event-outcome-exposure-consequence paths which 
allows the analysis to link the occurrence probabilities of each event 
which could lead to dam failure to the final consequences measured in 
commensurate and noncommensurate terms. This approach could be 
applied to all types of engineering projects. 
McCuen (1980) suggests that risk assessment with regard to earth 
dams should be performed using a Bayesian decision theory approach. 
He proposes that the decision process of selecting design criteria 
be considered to consist of a set of alternative design criteria 
(actions), a set of possible outcome events that are associated with 
each action, and a utility function that describes the value of each 
outcome. Different design criteria would be adopted depending on 
the potential damages which might be received in the event of a dam 
failure. McCuen does not appear to address the issue of changes in 
the utility function with time. 
A procedure for measuring and displaying the potential adverse 
contributions resulting from dam failures was presented by the Water 
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-Resources Council (1980) in which the types of adverse effects were 
described and dams were defined according to height as well as storage 
capacity. Failure condition possibilities were also defined and the 
procedures for evaluating the potential consequences resulting from 
dam failures were outlined. 
Probabilistic slope stab~lity. analysi~ 
Vanmarcke (1977) introduced a three-dimensional static approach 
to the probabilistic analysis of earth slopes. This was done by using 
a two-dimensional mechanical slip failure model with the third 
dimension included by considering the variability of the averages of 
soil properties along the axis of the embankment. He defined a 
statistic called the scale of fluctuation which indicates the rate of 
fluctuation of the soil properties about the mean value due to 
natural or in-place variabi lity in the soil properties. The scale of 
fluctuation can be considered to be the contributing parameter in the 
variance reduction function which describes the decrease in the 
variance of the varying. average of soil properties as the averaging 
distance is increased. Vanmarcke's method involves estimate of a 
critical width (along the embankment axis) of failure at which the 
probability of failure of the embankment is maximized. The method 
requires the designer to include the end resistance of the failure 
mass in the analysis. The probability of failure is maximized due to 
the reduction in the influence of the end resistance on the mean 
factor of safety. As the width is increased, the variance of the 
factor of safety decreases as described by the variance reduction 
function. 
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Vanmarcke (1979) demonstrated how his probabilistic approach to 
earth slope analysis could be adapted to any deterministic plane 
strain stability analysis method by using the ordinary method of 
slices to estimate the probability Pf(B) that a failure will occur 
anywhere along an embankment of length B. The method accounts for 
sources of uncertainty in the resisting moment due to natural or in~ 
place variability in the soil strength parameters, pore pressure and 
unit weight provided the variability of these factors can be described. 
Sharp et al. (1980) have ext·ended Vanmarcke's method to the 
analysis of the stability of zoned embankments in terms of effective 
stresses. Probabilities of failure were found for each trial failure 
surface under static loading conditions. 
A-Grivas (1980) performed a case study using the probabilistic 
seismic stability model of A-Grivas, Howland and Toleser (1979). The 
safety of the slope was measured in terms of its probability of 
failure with the numerical values being obtained through a Monte 
Carlo simulation of failure. The model was capable of accounting 
for significant uncertainties associated with conventional methods. 
Some of these uncertainties that are taken into account are: 
1. The variability of material strength parameters 
2. The location of potential failure surfaces 
3. Value of the maximum ground acceleration during an earth-
quake 
Three different types of seismic sources were investigated by A-Grivas: 
1. Point source 
2. Line (or fault) source 
3. Area source 
Based on the Monte Carlo simulation of failure, "probability of 
failure" vs. "distance between source and site" relationships were 
plotted for all three types of seismic sources. 
Inflow design flood analysis 
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Linsley and Franzini (1972) present methods for developing inflow 
design flood hydrographs as well as flow duration curves for specific 
drainage basins. Examples of these types of curves are given for 
various rivers and their corresponding drainage basins. Other 
hydrologic methods useful in predicting volume inflows over specific 
time intervals are also presented. 
Failure Mechanisms 
The geotechnical engineering literature contains much valuable 
information on past dam failures and failure mechanisms. This 
literature has been used in developing procedures for estimating the 
transition probabilities between events and system responses in the 
risk analysis procedure developed in the next chapter. Some of the 
failure mechanisms used in this study are discussed below. 
Landslides 
Jumikus (1979) presented several factors which determine the 
stability of natural slopes of rock walls. Those factors which are 
helpful in providing a basis for estimating the probability of the 
event "landslide into reservoir" are listed in Chapter IV. A static 
method for analyzing the stability of a natural slope with a geological 
discontinuity was also described. 
Rapid drawdown 
Sherard (1953) performed a study of upstream slides on twelve 
earth dams. He found that the majority of failures were caused by a 
drawdown between maximum water surface and mid-height of the dam at 
average rates varying between 0.3 and 0.5 feet per day. 
Sherard et al. (1963) found that most drawdown slides have 
occurred when the reservoir was lowered the first time, though a few 
have occurred after many years of successful operation. In some of 
the latter, the delay may have been due to a decrease in the shear 
strength of a clay emban~ment or foundation with time. In every case 
they studied, however, the slide was caused by a drawdown which was 
either faster or over a greater range than had occurred previously. 
Core cracking 
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Kulhawy and Grutowski (1976) discussed the phenomenon of load 
transfer with respect to zoned earth dams. They explained that the 
load transfer is due to differences in stiffnesses of the material in 
adjacent zones. When a condition exists where the dam has a soft core 
(low modulus) and a stiff shell (high modulus), the core will tend to 
settle with respect to the shell during construction. The results is 
that the core wi 11 tend to "hang" on the shell along the zone bound-" 
aries. Placement of the embankment in successive layers tends to 
accentuate this process with stresses in the core being less than 
those due to gravitational forces alone. If the reservoir is filled 
rapidly under these conditions, the water pressure could exceed the 
low stresses in the core. This could lead to hydraulic fracturing in 
the core and possibly piping. If the reverse is true (i.e. soft shell 
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and stiff core) the shell would hang on the core causing overstressing 
to occur. The result could be either plastic yield or brittle cracking 
of the core. 
Seismic loading 
Schnabel and Seed (1973) developed relationships between distance 
to causative fault and maximum acceleration for accelerations in rock. 
These relationships pertain to earthquakes in the western United States. 
Seed, Idriss, and Kiefer (1969) characterized bedrock motions by 
using several significant parameters: 
1. Maximum amplitude of the accelerations 
2. The predominant frequency or predominant period of the motion 
3. Duration of the motion 
They developed relationships for predominant periods vs. distance to 
causative fault for various earthquake magnitudes. 
Algermissen and Perkins (1973) proposed a technique for seismic 
zoning. A source area and/or active fault are used to predict the 
se1sm1C potenti~l for a given site. 
Haley and Hunt (1974) proposed a method to estimate the potential 
for the occurrences of earthquakes and their ground shaking character-
istics. They were able to estimate the average number of earthquakes 
that would occur for a given magnitude earthquake and bedrock acceler-
ation. This was applied from a predetermined study area and/or a 
major active fault. Exceedance probability vs. bedrock acceleration 
curves can then be developed for any given time interval such as 50 or 
100 years for determining design earthquake parameters. 
CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
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Methodology of the risk analysis procedure is characterized by 
its framework. details of the probabilistic procedure. and utilization 
of a growing data base. These components combine to describe a system 
of methods which can be used to evaluate the reliability of an earth 
dam as well as consequences resulting from its reliability. 
Framework of the Risk Analysis Procedure 
The framework of the risk analysis procedure is based on that 
proposed by Bowles, Anderson, and Canfield (1978) for earth dam pro-
jects. It is comprised of the following five major elements: 
1. Event 
2. System response 
3. Outcome 
4. Exposure (factors) 
5. Consequence 
The elements are related by transition probability linkages in such 
a way that th~ probability of specific consequences can be traced 
back to the probability of the initial event as illustrated in 
Figure 2. 
EVENT 
Figure 2. 
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Event-system response-outcome-exposure-consequence diagram. 
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Event 
Events can be considered to be the beginnings of potential 
failure conditions in dams and thus the "first cause" of the ultimate 
consequences of an earth dam failure. The magnitude of the process 
which forms the events is often described on a continuous scale (e.g. 
Richter s.cale for earthquakes). The event itself includes all magni-
tudes of the process which exceed the value at which failure will 
occur. An effort has been made to use every possible event which 
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could occur sometime in the life of an earth dam but, as in all risk 
assessments, there is a problem of incompleteness in that it is 
impossible to foresee all possible events. Most of the events 
identified in Figure 2 are considered to be independent events (de-
fined as the probability of two or more events occurring simultaneously 
being negligible). A few are considered to be correlated (defined 
as causally associated). Examples of the events which were used in 
this study are: flood, earthquake (ground shaking at damsite), 
failure of upstream dam, etc. (see Figure 2). 
System response 
The reaction of the earth dam structure due to the occurrence of 
one or more events has been called the system response. Again an 
effort was made to use as many probable system responses as could 
be conceived. Some examples of system responses are rise in pool 
level, slope stability failure, foundation spreading, etc. (see 
Figure 2). 
-Outcome 
The result of a system response or combination of responses 
establishes the probability of occurrence of each degree of failure. 
The three degrees of failure considered are: no failure, partial 
failure (no breaching or overtopping of dam). and complete failure 
by breaching and overtopping of the dam. Probabilities of each 
failure condition are accumulated based on the degree of the response 
of the dam. 
Exposure 
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The consequence of a dam failure will be determined by the 
structural damage, loss of ~ti1ity of the reservoir water, and by the 
downstream damages. The location of the reservoir and the factors 
which affect the magnitude of losses by the downstream activities, at 
the time it fails, are the exposure factors. An attempt has been 
made in this study to use certain factors which determine the exposure 
to dam failure. Examples of these exposure factors are: time of 
year, dam location, and flood warning time. 
Consequence 
The u1tUnate loss in terms of lives lost, economic losses (e.g. 
structural damage, loss of revenue), and natural aesthetic value are 
the consequences of dam failure. The degree of exposure at the time 
of either a partial or complete failure determines the magnitude of 
the consequences. Those types of losses which are significant with 
respect to an earth dam failure are included in this study. 
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Details of the Probabilistic Procedure 
Correlated event probabilities 
In order to take into account instances in which one or more 
events may occur simultaneously, a chart has been developed in which 
comparisons have been made between each of the events (see Figure 3). 
The instances in which a significant correlation can be considered 
to exist have been so indicated by "CE" (correlated event) in the 
square where the two events intersect. The subscripts on the "CE" 
in Figure 3 are to show that each correlation is different in magni-
tude, but nevertheless significant in terms of the degree of corre-
lation. 
A significant correlation is defined to exist if there is a 
possibility that two or more simultaneous events can result from a 
common cause. For example, heavy precipitation is a common cause for 
the events "landslide into reservoir" and "flood" (see Figure 4a). 
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The degree of correlation indicates the likelihood that both events 
will occur simultaneously. Care should be taken to distinguish 
between correlated events and independent events. Even though there 
is a remote probability that "end of construction" and "earthquake 
(ground shaking at damsite)" could occur simultaneously, it should be 
noted that there is no common cause to trigger both of the events (see 
Figure 4b). 
The simultaneous occurrence of two joint events will be treated 
as a separate event in the risk analysis procedure. It should be 
noted that these joint events are not shown in Figure 2 and that the 
_ J 
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Figure 3. 
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Classification of joint event pairs into independent and 
correlated pairs. 
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Figure 4. Event relationships. 
single events which are shown exclude the probability of the simul-
taneous occurrence of correlated events. The transition from corre-
lated joint event to system response will be linked to the same 
system responses as were the separate events. The probability of 
the occurrence of correlated joint events of a "landslide into reser-
voir" and a "flood" is given by: 
where 
L = event of a landslide into reservoir 
F = event of a flood 
The squares in Figure 3 which contain dashes {-} indicate that 
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two events are independent and although they could occur simultaneously, 
the probability that this will occur is insignificant since it is the 
product of two very small probabilities. 
Independent event probabilities 
The probability that single and correlated joint events will occur 
{PEi' PCEi} must be found to begin the risk analysis procedure. PF,i 
values are to be found for each independent event and a transitional 
procedure is performed for each of the probabilistic linkages to 
obtain a probability of system response based on that event {transi-
tional probability}, Descriptions of the procedures which will be 
used are outlined in Chapter IV of this study. Likewise, PCEi 
values are found for the correlated joint events and are treated as 
additional independent events in the analysis. 
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System response probabilities 
In the case of this risk analysis procedure, there are fifteen 
transition probabilities from single events as well as six from corre-
lated joint events. Based on the transitional procedure performed for 
each linkage which joins independent and correlated joint events with a 
corresponding system response, a transitional probability of a given 
system response is obtained. To obtain the total probability of a 
particular system response, the summation of the transitional probabil-
ities provides an estimate of the total probability of anyone system 
response: 
where 
n m 
r Ps . + r PSC . i=1 1. i=1 1. 
PSi = transitional probability of system response from linked 
independent events 
PSCi = transitional probability of system response from linked 
correlated events 
n = number of independent events linked to the specific 
system response 
m = number of correlated events linked to the specific 
system response 
PSR = Probability that a specific system response will occur 
In the case of the system response of "slope stability failure" for 
example: 
7 3 
Pss P(slope stability failure) r PSS i + L PSSC. i=l i=1 1. 
1 
where 
7 
L: PSS. 
i=l 1. 
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= P(slope stability failure given that rapid drawdown 
occurs) 
+ P(slope stability failure given that end. of construc-
and where 
3 
tion occurs) 
+ p( slope stability failure given that steady state 
seepage occurs) 
+ P(slope stability failure given that inadequate 
quality control occurs) 
+ P(slope stability failure given that design error 
occurs) . 
+ P(slope stability failure given that improper eva1u-
ation of soil properties occurs) 
+ P(slope stability failure given that earthquake 
occurs) 
L: PSSC
i 
= P(slope stability factor given that simultaneous 
i=l 
rapid drawdown and landslide into reservoir occur) 
+ P(slope stability failure given that simultaneous 
earthquake and landslide into reservoir occur) 
+ P(slope stability failure given that simultaneous 
earthquake and upstream dam failure occur) 
Outcome probabilites 
Once the probability for each specific system response has been 
obtained, the method for finding the outcome probabilities is very 
similar to that used for finding the system response probabilities. 
. . 1 
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Transition probabilities for the appropriate failure condition (no 
failure, partial failure, or complete failure) are found using methods 
discussed in Chapter IV. This is done for each of the linkages which 
join the system responses with the three outcome conditions. Since 
the system responses are treated independently, the probability of any 
one of the three outcome conditions is equal to the summation of the 
transition outcome probabilities which were linked to that condition: 
where 
Po .. = 
J 
PPOi = transition probability of outcome from linked system 
response 
n = number of system responses linked to the specific outcome 
PO j = probability that a specific outcome will occur 
In the case of the outcome of "no failure" for example' 
PNF = P(no failure) = 
where 
3 
E PNF. = P(no failure given that 
i=l 1. 
+ P(no failure given that 
+ P(no failure given that 
3 
E PNF. 
i=l 1. 
rise in pool 
core cracking 
differential 
level occurs) 
occurs) 
settlement occurs) 
In this manner, probabilities for each failure condition can be obtained . 
Estimation of Consequences 
The final consequences are estimated using the probability values 
obtained for partial failure and complete failure in conjunction with 
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the appropriate exposure factors. The probability of failure and the 
degree of exposure at the time of failure dictate the magnitude of the 
consequences. The consequences can be estimated by multiplying 
the estimated consequences (assuming that the failure occurred) by the 
probability of failure as shown in Table 1. The total consequence 
estimation will be the summation of dollars lost due to both the 
partial failure and complete failure conditions as well as the lost 
lives and acres of aesthetically pleasing land due to the complete 
failure. The consequences of each failure condition are estimated 
individually because the partial failure and complete failure are 
statistically mutually exclusive. 
Growing Data Base 
The available data pertaining to an earth dam increases with 
time. In the very early stages of a dam project there may be no 
specific information other than historical data on the reliability of 
earth dams of similar height, design and location. As time goes on. 
however, such information as borrow material properties, embankment. 
compaction, in-place density, foundation investigation, flood studies. 
etc. will develop and provide a basis for using the entire framework 
of the risk analysis procedure. In the early stages of the project, a 
risk analysis could be based on empirical evidence of reliability. 
As the data base expands, the procedures used to evaluate risk can 
become more detailed by considering each of the pathways in Figure 2 
using increasingly improved parameter estimates and consequently the 
analysis can be expected to be more representative of a particular dam 
structure. 
Table 1. Estimation of consequences. 
Estimated Consequences 
1. Repairable struc-
tural damage to 
dam (dollars) 
2. Loss of revenue 
(dollars) 
1. Irreparable 
structural 
damage to dam 
(dollars) 
2. Loss of revenue 
(dollars) 
3. Property damage 
(dollars) 
4. Loss of life 
(No. of lives) 
5. Loss of natural 
aesthetics (No. 
of acres) 
Failure 
Probability 
Partial Failure 
x 
Complete Failure 
x 
Total Estimation of Consequences 
== 
Consequences 
(dollars) 
(dollars) 
+(no. of lives) 
+(no. of acres) 
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== dollars (partial failure) 
+ dollars (complete failure) 
+ no. of lives (complete 
failure) 
+ no. of acres (complete 
failure) 
CHAPTER IV 
DESCRIPTION OF RISK ANALYSIS PROCEDURE 
Procedures for Estimat Probabilities 
In order to estimate the probability of occurrence of each 
outcome condition and the resulting consequences. the probabilities 
of each joint event, correlated joint event. transition probability, 
and system response must be estimated. Chapter III of this thesis 
explains how these probabilities are combined. The following section 
describes possible procedures which can be used to estimate these 
probabilities for use in the risk analysis procedure. 
Probability of events 
Event 1. The probability of the occurrence of event 1 "land-
slide into reservoir," is PEl' There are four basic types of 
landslides (see Figure 5): 
1. Falls 
2. Rotational slides 
3. Translational slides 
4. Flows 
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As a result of the slope condition, a probability exists that a slope 
located somewhere on the rim of the reservoir will fail. Probabilities 
of failure will be different for each type of landslide which can 
occur at any given location on the rim of the reservoir. The value 
of PEl could be obtained from a probabilistic slope stability analysis. 
This analysis could be performed on those areas around the reservoir 
-
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which are considered to have the greatest landslide potential based on 
empirical (e.g. case history) landslide frequency information as well 
as factors such as those listed below. These factors, which determine 
the stability of the slope .and those unique to the slope in question, 
should be used in conjunction with the results of the probabilistic 
slope stability analysis. Several factors can determine the stability 
of natural slopes. Jumikis (1979) suggests several factors: 
1. Rock and soil type of which or in which the slope is made 
2. Structure, stratification and attitude of the rock and soil 
formations (e.g. strata dip angle) 
3. Presence of a potential failure surface in the slope (fre-
quency of geological discontinuities) and the steepness of 
its angle of dip toward the reservoir 
4. Presence of breccia zones and clay seams 
5. Unit weight of slope material 
6. position of groundwater table 
7. Moisture content (degree of saturation) in the slope 
material 
8. Vibrations and seismic forces 
9. various environmental conditions and processes sculpturing 
the face of slopes (i.e. weathering, frost, and chemical 
action of pore water on soil and rock materials) 
Therefore, based on these factors as well as other important con-
siderations peculiar to the slope in question, an estimate of the 
landslide potential along the rim of the reservoir could be made. 
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Event 2. The probability of the occurrence of event 2 "flood," 
is PE2' The probability of PE2 could be estimated using state-of-
the-art methods to predict the probable maximum flood for the region 
in which the dam is located. This probable maximum flood would be 
used for dams in which the expected consequences for dam failure would 
be potentially large, or in other words, dams in which a risk analysis 
would be strongly recommended. Linsley and Franzini (1972) present 
methods for determining the probable maximum flood by means of a 
meteorological estimate of the physical limit of rainfall over a 
drainage basin. 
Event 3. The probability of the occurrence of event 3 '~ydraulic 
systems failure," is PE3' It will be assumed in this study that the 
main concern with respect to the hydraulic system failure will be with 
regard to the outlet gate. To obtain a value for PE3' the uncertainty 
of the quality or durability of a typical outlet gate must be dealt 
with. It will also be assumed that a failure in this case means that 
no water is allowed past the dam. A probability distdbution could be 
developed on the outlet gate based on manufacturers tests or tests 
performed by the engineer. The distribution would be the probability 
of failure vs. the number of years since its installation (see Figure 
6). Factors such as climate or location of the dam would need to be 
considered in the development of the distribution. Therefore, PE 3 
would be equal to the probability of failure of the outlet gate plus 
the probability of failure of the remaining hydraulic systems. The 
value of the latter probability would be an estimate based on judgment 
and on how many other hydraulic systems there are and their relative 
import ance . 
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Event 4, The probability of the occurrence of event 4 "improper 
dam operation," is PE4' To obtain the value for the probability 
that the dam will not be operated prop.erly, an understanding about 
human error would be needed. Based on case histories of engineerin~ 
projects which have failed due to operator failure (mistakes) and on 
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basic human behavioral studies, estimations of PE4 could be made. 
Nuclear power plant operation of recent years has necessitated studies 
of a similar nature in order to predict the probability of failure due 
to operator failures, Although probably more complex than earth dam 
considerations, results of these studies for nuclear power operation 
failures could be very valuable in obtaining a value for FE . 
'4 
Event 5. The probability of the occurrence of event 5 "con-
struction delays" is P.E . Several factors must be considered which 
5 
contribute to construction delays, they are: 
1. Problems with work force (striking, etc.) 
2. Problems with equipment 
3. Accidents and/or mistakes 
4. Weather (or other natural phenomena) 
5. Funding or budget delays 
Based on the particular group of workers which are selected for the 
job, an evaluation can be made using the first three factors listed 
above. This evaluation would be based on the general performance 
of the work force on similar jobs as well as the current general 
attitude of the labor market. Also, available empirical information 
(e.g. cases histories) would be beneficial. Based on this information, 
an estimation of PES could be made by means of a judgment decision. 
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Event 6, The probability of the occurrence of event 6 "failure 
f t d '" P o ups ream am, 1S E6' since PE6 is the probability that a dam 
will fail upstream, it would be found using the risk analysis procedure 
for that specific dam, if it is an earth dam. All other types of dams 
could be assessed PE6 using judgment based on inspection procedures 
such as risk assessment methods similar to those currently being used 
by several government institutions. 
Event 7. The probability of the occurrence .of event 7 "rapid 
drawdown," 1S PE7' The value of this probability would be estimated 
based on the characteristics and magnitude of the usage that the 
reservoir will receive. For example, if the reservoir is used for 
agricultural water supply, rapid drawdown would occur nearly every 
year and PE would be high, Some of the factors \Y'hich need to be 
7 
considered in evaluating PE would include: 
7 
I. Climate 
2. Location (land use in vicinity) 
3, Stream inflow and duration as a function of the time of year 
4, Reservoir water usage (outflow and duration as a function of 
the time of year) 
Event 8. The probability of the occurrence of event ~ "end of 
construction," is PES' The end of construction condition is important 
because of the buildup of pore pressures within the embankment. The 
value of PE is the probability that excessive pore pressures will 
8 
develop within the embankment during and immediately following con-
struction. The factors which affect pore pressure within the embank-
ment are: 
1. Type of embankment material 
2. Rate of construction 
3. Water content of embankment material 
4. Physical characteristics of embankment 
PES can be estimated using judgment based on the factors listed above 
as well as available empirical information (e.g. case histories). 
Event 9. The probability of the occurrence of event 9 "steady 
state seepage)" PE9' depends largely upon dam usage. For example, 
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if the reservoir is used mostly for recreational purposes or other 
uses which would require a relatively stable pool level, the value of 
PE9 would be close to one. In this case) however, there is a period 
of time after the reservoir has been filled before the steady state 
seepage condition can be reached. Other conditions, which cause 
regular fluctuations in the pool level of the reservoir (e.g. agricul-
tural use), would probably seldom allow the steady state seepage to 
occur. For these conditions the value of PE9 would be low. 
Event 10. The probability of the occurrence of event 10 "inade-
quate quality control," is PElO' Some of the factors which contribute 
to inadequate quality control include: 
1. Human error on the part of the inspector and/or contractor 
2. Incompetent inspector and/or contractor 
3. Intentional carelessness (one example: inspector "pads" 
reports to please contractor) 
4. Insufficient scope of the quality control program 
It is assumed here that all the responsibility with respect to quality 
control falls on the inspector and the contractor, The contractor 
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includes all of the workers. Based on past experience with inspectors 
and contractors as well as other available empirical information, PElO 
would be estimated using judgment. 
Event 11. The probability of the occurrence of event 11 "design 
error," is PEll' A design error is a design which is not correct with 
respect to the state-of-the-art design procedures. The major uncertainty 
which would need to be dealt with here is the frequency of human error 
among design engineers. Studies involving the design of nuclear power 
plants would be very useful in estimating the value of PEll . 
Event 12. The probability of the occurrence of event 12 "improper 
evaluation of soil properties," is PE 12' Some of the factors which 
con tribute to improper evaluation of soil properties are: 
1. Inadequate field studies (site, foundations, borrow area 
investigations, etc.) 
2. Incompetent engineers and/or technicians 
3. Soil samples that are not representative 
4. Testing errors 
5. Human errors 
PE12 would be estimated using statistical data on soil parameters as 
well as judgment. 
Event 13. The probability of the occurrence of event 13 "earth-
quake (ground shaking at the damsite)," is PE13' Based on studies 
which have been done by Haley and Hunt (1974), Schnabel and Seed 
(1972), Algermissen and Perkins (1973), and Seed, Idriss, and Kiefer 
(1969) an exceedance probability vs. bedrock acceleration curve can be 
developed for a given damsite. Therefore, values of PE13 can be 
obtained for specific design lives for each expected bedrock 
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acceleration. This enables the designer to predict the ground shaking 
which will occur at the damsite. 
Event 14. The probability of the occurrence of event 14 "burrow-
ing animals," is PE 14 . The biggest uncertainty associated with this 
probability is the type of animals which are found at or near the 
damsite. If the types of animals which burrow are found at or near 
the damsite the probability that the event "burrowing animals" will 
occur will be relatively high. A value for PE will need to be 14 
estimated based on these types of circumstances. 
Event 15. The probability of the occurrence of event 15 "sabotage 
and vandalism," is PE 
15 The best possible source of information 
available to assist in determining the value of PElS would be empirical 
in nature (e.g. case histories). PElS would be estimated using 
judgment and would be based on the number and frequency of situations 
in the past where sabotage and vandalism of earth dams has occurred. 
Probability of correlated joint events 
Six different joint event combinations were determined to be 
correlated. As explained in Chapter III, the probability of a corre-
lated joint event PCE. is the probabilities of the intersection of the 
l. 
two events which in this case are not independent. Therefore, the 
probability of the correlated joint events is less than or equal to 
the probability of either of the separate joint events. In the case 
of the correlated joint event of "landslide into reservoir" and 
"flood:" 
PCE I 
= peEl n E2 ) and 
P CE2 ::£ 
-where 
PCEI = Probability of correlated event 1 (landslide 
into reservoir and flood) 
PEl = Probability of event I (landslide into reservoir) 
PE2 = Probability of event 2 (flood) 
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The value of PCEi will be estimated by a judgment decision in which the 
extent to which each of the events are believed to be correlated. 
Probabilities of system response 
In order to obtain a probability of system response (PSR) re-
sulting from various event and/or correlated event probabilities, 
transition procedures must be performed for each of the linkages 
between the events and the system responses. A transition probability 
matrix has been developed in Figure 7 which illustrates each of the 
linkages and indicates the procedure to determine the partial prob-
ability corresponding to each linkage. The linkages will be identified 
using.matrix notation (x.y) where the x values are the system responses 
and the y values are the events of Figure 7. Descriptions of the 
procedures which could be used to obtain the part ial probabilities for 
each linkage in the matrix (Figure 7) will be covered in this section. 
Linkage <I,D. The event is "landslide into reservoir." The 
system response is "rise in pool level." Since landslides can take on 
various forms (i.e. fall, rotational slide, translational slide, and 
flow), the major uncertainty associated with this linkage is the mass 
volume which is released into the reservoir. This is very important 
because the rise in pool level is proportional to the water displaced 
by the landslide mass. A rigorous approach to this problem is not 
~ • J 
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possible at this time. Therefore, slope stability analysis combined 
with judgment would be used to estimate the transition probability 
of system response (PPLl)' 
Linkage (1,2). The event is "flood. II The system response 
is "rise in pool 1eve 1. If Flood routing techniques would be used 
to evaluate the pool level characterisitics resulting from a flood. 
Linsley and Franzini (1972) present methods for flood routing through 
controlled reservoirs. Special considerations would be required 
while evaluating the shape of the critical hydrograph for a given 
flood. Moderate inflow sustained over a long time interval could 
have a much greater affect on the total volume increase of the 
water in the reservoir than high inflows over a relatively short 
time interval. The transition probability (PPLZ) would be estimatec1 
based on the results of various flood routing configurations which 
show potential for a noticeable rise in pool level. 
Linkage 0,3). The event is "hydraulic systems failure." The 
system response is "rise in pool level." The major uncertainty 
associated with this linkage is the net inflow at the time of failure. 
For this procedure it will be assumed that hydraulic systems failure 
means that no water is allowed to pass through the outlet works. 
Therefore, the inflow at the time of failure will essentially be the 
streamflow if direct precipitation and groundwater are neglected 
during the critical period. Since the events are independent the 
relationship for this transition probability is: 
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where 
PPL2 = the probability of the flood which causes a noticeable 
rise in pool level occurring 
PE3 = the probability that the event, hydraulic systems fail-
ure, wi 11 occur 
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Linkage (1,4). The event is "improper darn operat ion. " The 
system response is "rise in pool level." It will also be assumed here 
that improper darn operation means that no water will pass through the 
dam's outlet works. Therefore, the relationship is as before: 
where 
PE4 = the probability that the event, improper darn operation, 
will occur. 
Linkage (6,4). The event is "improper dam operation." The 
system response is "structural failure of the apertenances." There 
may be cases in which the apertenant structures are not operated 
correctly and stresses which are not normally induced on the apertenant 
structures take place. High stresses could result from abnormal 
pressures produced by a phenomenon such as a "water hammer." To 
evaluate the probability that the apertenances would fail under these 
types of adverse conditions, empirical information in the form of 
either case histories or manufacturer's estimates of apertenance 
structural performance would be used to estimate the transition 
probability, (PSFl )' 
Linkage 0,5). The event is "construction delays." The system 
response is "rise in pool level." Since the dam is still under 
construction, in this case the only outlet for the water is through 
the diversion tunnel. The relationship will still be the same: 
where 
PES the probability that the event, construction delays, will 
occur 
It should be noted here that the value of PPL2 will be different than 
before. since the flood magnitude which would cause a noticeable rise 
in pool level would be different than for the full reservoir. 
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Linkage (1,6). The event is "failure of upstream dam." The 
system response is "rise in pool level." This linkage would be 
analyzed using state-of-the-art flood routing techniques. The failure 
of the upstream dam would be assumed to be an instantaneous, complete 
release of its impounded water. Some of the factors that would affect' 
the probability of the rise in pool level would be: 
1. Volume of the upstream reservoir 
2. Distance between the reservoirs 
3. Characteristics of the river channel between the reservoirs 
(e.g. narrow. deep, winding, etc.) 
A good approximation for the transition probability of a rise in pool 
level due to failure of an upstream dam is: 
where 
PE6 = the probability that the event, failure of upstream dam, 
will occur 
It would not be a good approximation, however, if the factors listed 
above caused the flood wave to dissipate. This indicates the necessity 
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of the flood routing analysis in order to determine how the flood wave 
is affected by those factors. 
Linkage (2,7). The event is "rapid drawdown." The system 
response is "slope stability failure." The uncertainties which need 
to be considered with regard to a slope stability failure resulting from 
rap id drawdown are: 
1. Variability of the soil properties as a function of their 
location in the embankment 
2. Drawdown characteristics (rate, magnitude, etc.) 
3. Existing condition of the dam as a result of the drawdown 
(stresses, pore pressures, etc.) 
The embankment should be analyzed using a probabilistic slope stability 
analysis developed by Sharp et al. (1980). This computer program will 
provide an estimate of the probability of failure for several failure 
surfaces based on the static conditions imposed by the rapid drawdown 
condition. To perform the analysis on existing embankments. a 
field testing program would be required to determine the in situ 
soil properties. Laboratory testing facilities would also be needed 
for the analysis. This transition probability of slope stability 
failure (PSS l ) can be expressed as: 
where 
PSS l = (PE 7) PFrd 
PE7 = probability that the event "rapid drawdown" will occur 
PF
rd = greatest probability of failure obtained from the 
probabilistic slope stability analysis based on the 
rapid drawdown condition 
- . 
- 1 
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Linkages (2,8 and 9). The events are "end of construction" and 
"steady state seepage." The system response is "slope stability 
failure." The uncertainties which should be considered with re~ard to 
these events are: 
1. The variability of the soil properties as a function of 
location in the embankment 
2. The existing condition of the dam resultinJt from the event 
(stresses, pool level, etc.) 
The static loading conditions resulting from the event in question 
would be estimated and used in the probabilistic slope stability 
analysis. The soil properties of the embankment obtained from the 
testing program would also be used in the program. These transition 
probabilities of slope stability failure (PSSZ and PSS3) can be 
expressed as: 
where 
where 
PES = probability that the event "end of construction" will occur 
PS ec = greatest probability of failure obtained.from the probabil-
istic slope stability analysis of the slope based on the 
end of construction condition 
PEg = probability that the event "steady state seepage" will 
occur 
PS ss = greatest probability of failure obtained from the probabil-
istic slope stability analysis of the slope based on the 
steady state seepage condition 
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Linkages (3,8 and 9). The events are "end of construction" and 
"steady state seepage." The system response is "foundation spreading." 
The uncertainties as well as the analysis of these transition probabil-
ities are identical to those of linkages (3,8) and (3,9) with the 
exception that they would also apply to the foundation as well as the 
embankment. The expressions are: 
where 
where 
PFSI = (PES) PF ec 
PFec = greatest probability of failure obtained from the probabil-
istic slope stability analysis of the foundation based 
on the end of construction condition 
PFss = greatest probability of failure obtained from the probabil-
istic slope stability analysis of the foundation based on the 
steady state seepage condition 
Linkage (4,8 and 9). The events are "end of construction" 
and "steady state seepage." The system response is "core cracking." 
The uncertainty to be considered in addition to those mentioned for 
the transition slope stability probabilities 1S the behavior of the 
core and shell materials relative to each other. These transition 
probabilities of core cracking (PeCl and PCCZ) can be estimated from 
estimates of the relative settlement between core and shell zones. 
Investigation of embankment and foundation would be required to 
predict such settlement. Loading conditions would depend on which 
event was being considered. Settlement would be predicted based on 
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two main conditions. Usually the core and the shell material have 
different stiffnesses. Hydraulic fracturing could occur in the core 
if it settled relative to the shell. However, if the shell settled 
relative to the stiff core, plastic yielding or brittle cracking could 
occur. Other factors such as compaction methods could have an affect 
on the probability estimations (e.g. compacting wet or dry of optimum). 
Linkage (5,9). The event is "steady state seepage." The system 
response is "piping." Since there are essentially no deterministic 
methods available at this time to analyze piping in soil structures, 
the transition probability of piping (PPl) will be estimated using a 
judgment decision approach. The estimate would be based on factors 
such as: 
1. Zoned or homogenous dam 
2. Materials in embankment (how do materials vary from zone to 
zone, if zoned dam) 
3. Filter characteristics, if any 
4. Foundation characteristics (fractured, grouted, etc.) 
5. Pool leve 1 
Case histories in which dams have failed due to piping would be 
valuable in estimating the probability. 
Linkages (7,8 and 9). The events are "end of construction" and 
"steady state seepage." The system response is "differential settle-
ment." Once again, the transition probabilities of differential 
settlement (PDS 1 and PDS2) would need to be estimated based on 
results of static settlement analyses. Using appropriate static 
loading conditions according to the event in question, a static 
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settlement analysis would be performed at selected locations on the 
embankment. Dunn, Anderson, and Kiefer (1980) describe current 
available methods such as Bonsennesq or Westergaard which could be 
used for granular soils, as well as Terzaghi's method which could be 
used for cohesive soils. A probabilistic settlement analysis could be 
developed. This would involve a probabilistic characterization of the 
foundation soil profile using the method suggested by Vanmarcke (1977). 
Linkages (1-7, 10). The event is "inadequate quality control." 
The system responses are all responses. The major uncertainty here is 
the extent to which the quality control is inadequate and the affect 
this degree of inadequacy has on each system response. For this study 
it will be assumed that the transition probability for each system 
response is equal to the probability of the event "inadequate quality 
control." This assumption·is based on the consideration that if the 
event takes place, it will cause each appropriate system response to 
take place as well. Therefore, the probability of the event becomes 
the transition probability of the system response. This is a conser-
vative approach, but appropriate for this stage of development of the 
risk analysis procedure. Therefore they can be expressed as: 
PEW = PPL7 = PSS4 = PFS3 = PCC3 = PP2 = PSF2 == PDS3 
Linkages 0-7, 11). The event is "design error." The system 
responses are all responses. The consideration of these transition 
probabilities would be handled much the same as they were for the 
event "inadequate quality control." Again, the main uncertainties 
would be the number of design errors and the significance they would 
have on the system responses. The transition probabilities of each 
system response can be estimated as before as being equal to the 
probability of the event "design error." They can be expressed as: 
PEll = PPLS = PSSs = PFS4 = PCC4 = PP3 = PSF3 = PDS4 
Linkages (2-4 and 6, 12). The event is "improper evaluat ion of 
soil properties." The system responses are all applicable responses. 
The evaluation of the transition probabilities as well as the uncer-
tainties to be considered would be similar to linkages (1-7,10) and 
linkages (1-7,11). The transition probabilities can therefore be 
expressed as: 
PE 12 = PSS 6 = PFSS = PCCS = PP4 = PDSS 
Linkage (l, 13). The event is "earthquake (ground shaking at 
damsite." The system response 1S "rise in pool level." As explained 
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earlier, relationships of exceedance probability vs. bedrock acceleration 
can be obtained. Therefore, the main uncertainty is the bedrock 
acceleration required to cause a noticeable rise in pool level (wave 
of water in reservoir),. The estimation of this transition probability 
for rise in pool level (PPL9) would be a judgment decision aided by 
case histories, a theoretical analysis of water waves induced by 
tectonic displacements and the seismic history at or near the damsite. 
Linkage (2,13). The event is "earthquake (ground shaking at 
damsite." The' system response is "slope stability failure." The 
transition probability of slope stability failure (PSS 7) can be found 
using a probabilistic seismic stability analysis such as the one 
outlined by A-Grivas, Howland, and Toleser (1979). This model ac-
counts for the following uncertainties: 
1. Variability of material strength parameters 
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2. Exact location of potential failure surfaces 
3. Value of the maximum ground acceleration during an earthquake 
In the analysis, the material comprising the slope is assumed to be 
statistically homogeneous and potential failure surfaces are taken to 
be of a~ exponential shape (log-spiral). The maximum acceleration 
during the earthquake is the seismic load, and its probability of 
occurrence can be estimated using the method proposed by Algermissen 
and Perkins (1973) and by Haley and Hunt (1974). A-Grivas, Howland, 
and Toleser (1979) assume that the slope is rigid and, therefore, the 
maximum ground acceleration is equal to that of the slope. Using 
attenuation relationships for the region, curves can be developed for 
"probability of failure" va. "distance between source and site" 
(point source), "distance between fault and site" (fault source) or 
"radius of area source" (area source) such as those shown in Figure 8. 
Hence, for a given earthquake magnitude or maximum accelerat ion, 
probabilities of failure can readily be found for the appropriate 
sources. Therefore, for a given earthquake magnitude, the transition 
probability can be expressed as: 
where 
PSS 7 = (PE 13)(PSA) 
PSA • probability of failure calculated from the probabilistic 
seismic stability analysis. 
Linkase (3, 13). The event is "earthquake (ground shaking at 
damsite)." The system response is "foundation spreading." This would 
be analyzed in a manner similar to linkage number (2,13) with one 
exception. More attention and consideration should be made in terms 
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of the existing foundation conditions. The wide variability in the 
types of foundations which could be encountered (from bedrock to soft, 
deep unconsolidated material) in damsites could have a si~nificant 
affect on the potential for foundation spreadin~ durin~ dynamic 
loading conditions. 
,!-inkage (4, 13). The event is "earthquake (~round shakin~ at 
damsite)." The system response is "core cracking." Predications can 
be made for ground acceleration characteristics based on earthquake 
magnitudes. Since the development of a deterministic method for 
analyzing the cracking of the cOre material in an earth dam is still 
in its infant stages, a judgment decision would be used to estimate 
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the transition probability of core cracking (PCC6" Knowing the 
strength characteristics of the core and shell materials would be 
valuable in this estimate. Testing programs involving both static and 
cyclic shear tests would be desirable. 
Linkage (7, 13). The event is "earthquake (ground shaking at 
damsite)." The system response is "differential settlement." The 
value of the transition probability of differential settlement (PnR6 ) 
would again be estimated in this case. Case histories involvin~ 
settlement during an earthquake of materials similar to those found in 
a dam embankment or foundation would be helpful in estimatin~ the 
probability of differential settlement (Pns6 ). Also, multidirectional 
shaking tests such as those performed by Pyke, et al. (1974) could be 
done on representative models. 
J.inkage (5, 14). The event is "burrowing animals." The system 
response is "piping." The value of the transition probability of pipin~ 
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(PP4) will depend very much on the circumstances which surround the 
dam. Since most animals which burrow do not burrow very deep, the 
size of the dam can be an important factor. The only animals which 
tend to burrow quite deep are ground squirrels but they will stop once 
they encounter seeping water or moist soil. Therefore, for a large 
dam with a stable pool level, the value of PP4 would be almost 
zero. 
Linkage (6, 15). The event is "sabotage and vandalism." The 
system response is "structure failure of the apertenances. The major 
uncertainties here are: 
1. The degree to which vandalism can contribute to the structural 
failure of the apertenances 
2. The motives for such events which are peculiar to a particular 
dam or damsite 
Since the motive of sabotage is destruction, it will be assumed that 
the probability of sabotage alone is equal to the probability of 
structural failure of the apertenances due to loads induced on the 
structure resulting from sabotage. This probability will not be the 
same as for other loading conditions. The degree of structural 
failure of the apertenances resulting from vandalism will depend on 
the following: 
1. Characteristics of the act 
2. Extent of the act 
3. Number of unnot iced repet it ions 
Case histories will be the best tool in estimating the transition 
probability of structural failure of the apertenances (PSF4)' Con-
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siderations involving those factors listed above will also be valuable 
in the judgment decision. 
Probabilities of outcome 
Once the probabilities for each system response have been deter-
mined by taking the summation of its own partial probabilities, the 
outcome probabilities can be found in a similar manner. To obtain the 
outcome probability Po resulting from various system response prob-
abilities, transition procedures must be performed for each linkage 
between the system responses and the outcomes. Another transition 
probability matrix has been developed in Figure 9 which shows the 
procedure used to determine the partial probability corresponding to 
each linkage. Descriptions of these procedures will be covered in 
this section. As has been done previously, matrix notation (x,y) will 
be used to label the linkages in this section. These linkages, 
however, will correspond to Figure 9. The "x" values will represent 
the outcomes and the "y" values will represent the system responses. 
Linkages (1-3, 1). The system response is "rise in pool level." 
The outcomes consist of all appropriate outcomes. Major uncertainties 
associated with these linkages would be: 
1. Existing freeboard at the time the rise begins 
2. Rate of pool level rise (most likely not constant) 
3. Duration of the rise 
The freeboard would vary depending on uses such as irrigation, munici-
pal, wildlife, etc. From a general standpoint, the freeboard would 
probably be a function of the time of year. Based on model studies 
and case histories, probability distribution curves could be developed 
Figure 9. 
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Matrix of available and proposed methods for estimating 
transition probabilities of outcomes given a system response 
occurs. 
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for different cases involving "rate of rise" and "rise duration" (see 
Figure 10). This would provide ranges of values for the probabilities 
of each outcome condition for a given initial freeboard. This would 
be valuable in making the estimations for each transition probability 
(PNFl' PPFl' PCFl)' 
Linkages (2 and 3, 2). The system response is "slope stability 
failure." The outcomes are "part ial failure" and "complete failure." 
Probably the biggest factor which would determine the outcome of the 
dam from a slope stability failure, is the location of the slip 
surface. The depth of failure, for example, can determine whether or 
not the crest is affected and whether the dam is breached. Both the 
probabi listic slope stability analysis and the seismic analysis 
provide this information as well as the probability of failure. 
Therefore, based on case histories and model studies, probability 
distributions could be developed (see Figure 11) as an aid in esti-
mating these two transition outcome probabilities (PPF2' PCF2)' 
,!.inkages (2 and 3, 3). The system response is "foundation 
spreading," The outcomes are "part ial failure" and "complete failure," 
An identical procedure could be used to estimate PPF3 and PCF3' 
However, the considerations would now apply to the foundation as well 
as the embankment, Care must be taken to consider the variable nature 
of the foundation conditions. 
Linkage 0-3, 4). The system response is "core cracking." The 
outcomes consist of all appropriate outcomes, The uncertainty which 
would probably have the biggest effect on the outcome will be the 
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1. Length 
2. Location in the embankment 
3. Direction (longitudinal, transverse, etc,) 
4. Size of opening 
5, Others 
Since there is no deterministic method at this time to predict the 
physical characteristics of cracks in soil structures, probabilities 
would be estimated using a judgment decision approach. Case studies 
as well as the amount of confidence placed in precautions (e.g. com-
pacting core material wet of optimum) would be the most valuable aids 
in making such an estimation. 
Linkages (2 and 3, 5). The system response is "piping." The 
outcomes are "partial failure" and "complete failure." The extent to 
which piping will occur is an uncertainty which will have a great 
effect on the outcome of the dam. Some of the factors involved would 
be: 
1. Amount of fines removed 
2. Characteristics of void 
3. Location of void 
4. Others 
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Like core cracking, there are no deterministic methods available at 
this time for piping failures. If and when the piping was discovered 
would also have a significant impact on the outcome. Due to the 
nature of piping failures, it is very likely that the vast majority of 
such failures would result in complete failure, unless it had been 
discovered in its early stages. Based on these types of factors, 
estimations for PPF5 and PCF5 can be made. 
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Linkages (2 and 3, 6). The system response is "structural failure 
of the apertenances." The outcomes are "partial failure" and "complete 
failure." The extent of failure of the apertenances would have a 
large impact on the outcome. Some of the factors would be: 
1. Number of structures that failed 
2. Whether or not structures are permanently dama~ed 
3. Expected repair time, if repairs are possible 
4. Others 
Since the greatest concern with respect to an apertenance failure is 
the uncontrolled filling or expelling of reservoir water, possible 
repair of the structures as well as repair time would be important 
factors in the outcome. The pool level at the time of failure would 
also need to be considered. Based on these as well as other pertinent 
factors unique to a particular dam, estimations for PPF6 and PCF6 can 
be made. 
Linkages 0-3, 7). The system response is "di fferential settle-
ment." The outcomes consist of all appropriate outcomes. The uncer-
tainties which can cause concern with respect to differential settle-
ment in earth dams are: 
1. Degree of relative movement within the embankment resulting 
from the settlement 
2. Amount of freeboard loss due to settlement 
3. Others 
The concern which exists about relative movement is due to the potential 
of significantly large cracks occurring in the embankment. Many times 
the configuration of the abutments and foundation will determine the 
.~. 
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type of cracking that will occur. With regard to freeboard loss, it 
is highly unlikely that a complete failure could occur due to a free-
board loss resulting from differential settlement. The settlements are 
not large enough. Estimations for PNF3' PPF7' and PCF7 can then be 
made based on careful consideration of the conditions presented above. 
Estimation of Consequences 
Exposure factors 
Once the probabilities for each of the outcome conditions (PNF, 
PPF, PCF) are known, the magnitude of the consequences can be esti-
mated on the basis of various exposure factors includin~' 
1. Time of year 
2. Dam location 
3. Flood warning time 
Time of year. This exposure factor affects two ma1n conditions: 
1. Pool level (i.e. volume of impounded water) 
2. Number of people in potential flood area 
Potential impounded water usage predictions used in conjunction with 
hydrological studies of the area would be valuable in predicting 
net flow (whether it be outflow or inflow) as a function of the time 
of year. Relationships could then be developed for the volume of 
impounded water as a function of the time of year. 
Present and projected future land use of the area would allow 
predictions of populations in potential flood zones downstream of the 
dam. Since the land use around or near a reservoir is very often of a 
recreational nature populations vs. time of the year relationships 
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would need to be developed from available local information. Although 
these predications would be unique to each dam considered, they could 
be developed by using case histories of dams with similar character-
istics (i.e. recreation, irrigation, and other needs which have shaped 
the surrounding population growth). 
Dam location. This exposure factor affects land use downstream 
which in turn affects the following: 
1. Number of people downstream 
2. Amount of property downstream (structures, agriculture, etc.) 
3. Aunt of aesthetically pleasing land downstream 
The recreation potential and climate also can have a lar~e affect on 
the land use downstream. Present and predicted future quantities of 
people, property and aesthetically valuable land in the potential 
flood zones, would need to be done as a function of the life of the 
earth dam structure. Zoning maps as well as case histories of similarly 
located dams would facilitate these predications. 
Flood warning time. This exposure factor is not considered in 
estimating consequences resulting from a partial failure since no 
flood is involved. This exposure factor affects the following: 
1. Steps which can be taken to save people 
2. Steps which can be taken to save property 
3. Steps which can be taken to save natural aesthetics 
Definitions of potential flood zones will be beneficial in describinjt 
the affect of flood warning time. Similar to a recommended procedure 
of the Water Resources Council (1980) the flood zones are the following: 
1. Primary flood zone, the area which is in the direct path of 
the flood water currents 
2. Secondary flood zone, the area which is subject to rising 
flood waters, but is not in its direct path 
Based on either actual trial runs or case histories of evacuations 
which have occurred in the past, estimates could be made on how many 
people could be evacuated per unit of time. Flood warning time would 
probably have little effect on damages occurring in the primary flood 
zone. However, with sufficient warning, steps could be taken to save 
a good portion of the property and natural aesthetics damage in the 
secondary flood zone. 
Procedures for estimating consequences 
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Using the exposure factors listed above, estimates of consequences 
can be made. The procedures for these consequences are explained below. 
Repairable structural damage to dam. This would depend almost 
totally on the type of system response or combination of _responses 
that caused the partial failure. Estimates of dollar damages would be 
made by using average repair costs per unit time multiplied by the 
estimated time of repair. The estimated time of repair would be a 
direct result of the type and extent of damage incurred on the earth 
dam structure. As presented in Chapter III, the repair cost estimate 
in dollars is multiplied by the probability of partial failure to equal 
the expected costs of the structural damage due to a partial failure. 
Loss of revenue. R,~venue refers to the regular income from the 
existence of the dam. Revenue is obtained based on the following 
factors: 
1. Power generation 
2. Irrigation (water rights, taxation, etc.) 
3. Flood control 
4. Recreation 
5. Navigation 
6. Others 
Not all of these factors apply to every dam. Based on these factors, 
a study would be required to estimate the revenue in dollars per vear 
which would be lost if the dam was no longer operable. Since loss of 
revenue can result from either a partial or complete failure outcome, 
estimations of revenue loss would be done separately as explained in 
Chapter III. 
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Irreparable structural damage to dam. This type of damage can be 
estimated in terms of dollars. It is the estimated cost of the earth 
dam project. 
Loss of lives, property and natural aesthetics. To estimate 
losses of lives, property and natural aesthetics, a method such as the 
one proposed by the Water Resources Council (1980) could be used. 
There are basically four main steps in this method: 
1. Delineate the affected zones 
a. primary flood zone 
b. secondary flood zone 
2. Determine characteristics of affected zones (descriptions 
of the existing and projected characteristics of the potential 
flood zones) 
3. Projections of activities and land use of potential flood 
zones 
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4. Collection of land market values of potential flood zones and 
related data 
Using flood routing techniques, the primary and secondary flood zones 
could be delineated on maps of the area of the damsite. The data 
obtained from the four steps listed above is then used to estimate the 
property damage in dollars, the lives lost and the loss of natural 
aesthetics in terms of acres inundated. 
r , 
,.... 1 
CHAPTER V 
POTENTIAL APPLICATIONS OF THE 
RISK ANALYSIS PROCEDURE 
Discussion 
It should be emphasized at this point that the risk analysis 
should not be used as the "final word" for risk assessment of the dam 
at this time. It is, however, a very valuable source of information 
for the engineer in making engineering decisions pertaining to earth 
dam planning, design, construction, and operation. 
Decisions involving cost and 
safety trade-offs 
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Many decisions must be made during the planning, design, construc-
tion, and operation of earth dams. Many of these decisions involve 
trade-offs between increasing costs and increasing safety. An example 
which involves an economic criterion for defining an acceptable level 
of risk consists of three curves as shown in Figure 12. Curve a) re-
presents the plot of cost vs. dam embankment base width. Curve b) re-
presents the relationship between expected cost due to damages resulting 
from dam failure vs. dam embankment base width. Curve c) represents 
the summation of curves a) and b) and reveals the embankment base 
width at which the combined costs are at a minimum <indicated by 
point x in the figure). However, current design practices might 
require a minimum embankment base width of the value, point y. Tn 
this case the dam would have to be built according to accepted practice 
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at an increased cost of ilz ($). This emphasizes the point that 
although the minimum cost can be found for various economic consider-
ations of the dam project~ that minimum cost may not be at an accept-
able level of risk. 
Decisions based on risk analysis results 
The expected values of the consequences of an earth dam failure 
obtained from the risk analysis procedure can be very valuable in 
terms of making these decisions which include the following items: 
1. Site selection 
2. Selection of design parameters 
3. Materials selection 
4. Embankment cross-sectional geometry and apertenant struc-
tural design 
5. Quality control 
6. Operating rules 
There are potentially many other items in which risk analysis cou1d 
lead to a more rational basis for decision making under uncertainty, 
However~ the discussion below will be limited to the use of risk 
analysis procedures in decision making with respect to the items 
listed above. 
Site selection. Many factors are taken into account with respect 
to the selection of a particular damsite. Obviously, the amount of 
material which is going to be required to construct an earth dam is 
going to depend largely on the width of the structure. There are many 
other things to consider, however. The geologic characteristics 
, 
of the foundation and/or abutments could jeopardize the site in terms 
- .... , 
of the potential safety of the dam. A risk analysis procedure could 
prove very valuable in making decisions which would provide a balance 
between economy and safety of a particular damsite. After several 
potential sites have been considered and the list had been narrowed 
down to two or three, the risk analysis could be performed on the 
potential sites. Although the data base at this point would be very 
small, an assessment of the risk could be made for the damsites based 
on case histories of failures of similar dams. Outcome and final 
consequence estimations could then be used, in con;unction with other 
pertinent factors, to make a final decision as to which damsite would 
be the best in terms of safety, economy, and all other applicable 
cons iderations. 
Selection of design parameters. If the risk analysis pro-
cedure revealed, for example, that the potential rise in pool level 
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was the major contributor in the potential failure and ultimate 
consequences associated with a particular dam, this information could 
lead to a decision to enlarge the emergency spillway. Other decisions 
may be with regard to slope stability considerations in which decisions 
may be made, for example, to flatten the embankment slopes. In any 
case, the risk analysis can facilitate decision making during any part 
of the design stage. 
Materials selection. The variability of the soil properties 
of the embankment materials is an important factor in determining the 
expected value of the consequences of dam failure. It is analyzed by 
means of the probabilistic slope stability analysis to determine the 
probability of a slope stability failure in the risk analysis procedure. 
In general, the more variable the soil strength properties are, the 
higher the probability of failure becomes, When attempting to select 
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a borrow area, for example, some areas may contain soils with more 
variable soil properties than others. Hence, even though one borrow 
area may be closer to the site and therefore cheaper to haul~ it may 
not be the best choice if it is highly variable with regard to its soil 
strength properties. If variability in the material is excessive, a 
decision may have to be made to import material from more distant 
borrow areas which could lead to rejection of the site if hauling 
costs for borrow areas with lower variability soils are too high. 
Quality control. As discussed in the materials selection 
topic, soil variability plays an important part in the embankment 
safety. Quality control is a means of reducing the variability of 
every aspect of a dam project as well as the soil strength properties. 
The risk analysis procedure provides a means for establishing the 
level of quality control to be used by trading off the increases in 
construction costs associated with higher levels of quality control 
against the reduction in the expected consequences of dam failure. If 
it is determined that the high degree of quality control significantly 
enhances the safety of the earth dam, a decision could be made to 
increase the quality control and use a more economical materials 
source. 
Operating rules. Since one of the major factors associated 
with the operation of the dam is the control of the impounded water, 
an important consideration is the influence of the operating rules on 
the safety of the dam. This consideration could be handled by 
performing a risk analysis on a few extreme cases and comparing the 
results. If effects are not too great, for example, operating rules 
may not need to be very rigid. Other aspects regarding the dam 
operation may also be tried and decisions made accordingly. 
Case Study of Growing Data Base 
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In cooperation with the Water and Power Resources Service, the 
Soldier Creek Dam of Utah was selected for a case study of the proposed 
risk analysis procedure. Due to the. limited research development funds 
available at this time, it was not possible to perform analytical work 
on Soldier Creek Dam. The feasibility study of this earth dam, which 
is part of the Central Utah Project, was commenced in 194R and was 
completed in approximately 1974. A study performed by W. A. Wahler 
and Associates was presented in June 1977 and recommended that the 
reservoir filling process be delayed. Data and information on the 
Soldier Creek Dam was supplied by the Engineering and Research Center 
office, Denver, Colorado. A chronological list of the documents 
supplied is shown in Table 3. The material has been compiled in Table 
2 to illustrate the "growing data and information baset! for Soldier 
Creek Dam. As shown in this table, the various reports, tests, and 
analyses are categorized by activity types and located on a time 
scale. A detailed project activity sequence summary has been compiled 
(see Table 4 in the appendix) and contains a brief description of 
activities in their time sequence. 
With the available data on Soldier Creek Dam and with extra data 
available from WPRS, it will be possible to test the risk analysis 
Table 2. Soldier Creek Dam growing data base. 
Activity 
Hydrology 
Geology 
Seismicity 
Slope 
Stability 
Soil 
Properties 
48 55 
Reconnai-
ssance 
Foundat ion 
Hydraulics 
Project 
Activity 
Sequence* 
56 57 58 
Inflow 
Flood 
Study 
59 60 61 62 63 
Report 
61. 
Lab 
Tests 
65 6~ 
Report 
Explora-
Lion 
R.port 
67 n~ 69 70 71 
Stability 
Calculations 
I> 
Construc-
tion 
Materials 
Test Data 
Explora-
tion 
Spill-
way 6. 
Out let 
Sumroary 
8 9 
*See project activity description to decode nllmber~ (Table 4 in the appendix) 
Seismic 
Monitor-
ing 
Earth 
Work 
Tests 
10 
-:: 
73 71. 75 76 77 78 79 
Bank Reser-
Storage- voir Flood 
Cap- Sum-
ab1litymary 
In, pec-
tion f, 
Seepage 
Con-
struction 
Engineering 
Geology 
Report 
Grout-
ing 
II 12 13 
Earth 
Quake 
Eval-
uation 
Embank-
ment and 
Founda-
tion 
Inspection 
Abut-
ment 
Drilling 
Seepage 
Inspec-
tion of 
Abutments 
14 15 
80 
..... 
N 
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procedure. Since the Soldier Creek Dam is complete, the next phase of 
the case study will explore the differences in risk analysis results 
obtained at different stages in the project's life. It would also 
indicate which of the proposed methods for estimatin~ transition 
probabilities can be used and which need to be modified. An indication 
of what kinds of data are more useful than others in performing the 
risk analysis procedure will also be obtained. This indication will 
be valuable in recommendations for the types of data which should be 
obtained from sampling and testing. 
Advantages 
Advantages and Limitations of 
the Risk Analysis Procedure 
1. A design with a higher factor of safety does not necessarily 
lead to a safer structure 
2. The designer is required to explicitly consider all of the 
failure mechanisms 
3. Quantitative estimates of the transition probabilities are 
required and this enables the designer to identify the most 
likely modes of failure 
4. The procedure is adaptable to the "growing data base" of a 
dam 
Limitations 
1. Uncertainties associated with the probabilities which are 
estimated using judgment and empirical data 
2. Considerable weight in the analysis is placed on transition 
probabilities estimated by judgment 
3. The framework may not be complete because some events and/or 
linkages may have been overlooked 
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4. All the information needed to perform the analysis may not be 
readily available 
5. A considerable amount of time and effort would be required 
to perform the enti.re analysis 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
_Conc 1 us ions 
A framework for risk analysis of an earth dam has been presented 
with suggested procedures for estimating transition probabilities. 
The general framework is also applicable to other types of civil 
engineering structures. 
1. Before the probabilistic models, empirical and judgment pro-
cedures can be applied in practice, the risk analysis procedure 
needs to be further developed. In addition, procedures for 
utilizing the knowledge of engineers to make the suh;ective 
probability estimates need to be developed. 
2. The value of the continuation of future development of a practical 
comprehensive risk analysis procedure for earth dams cannot be 
over emphasized based on the advantages listed in Chapter V. 
3. The confidence which can be placed in the results of the risk 
analysis procedure may be reduced due to certain limitations of 
the procedure such as those listed in Chapter V. 
4. A possible means for handling the subjective probability estimates 
is to lump these transition probabilities together and use histori-
cal values to estimate the lumped probabilities. Baecher, et a1. 
(1980) proposed a similar procedure in which they presented the 
-4 possibility that the observed rate of failure of 10 represents 
the frequency of unexpected causes. 
- 1 
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Recommendations 
1. To provide a practical test of the proposed risk analysis procedure 
and to give opportunity for refining the techniques for estimatin~ 
the transition probabilities, a detailed case study of Soldier 
Creek Dam should be performed. Phases of the project in which data 
were either not available or insufficient to make adeQuate;udjm1ent 
estimations, could be estimated by using lumped probabilities as 
described above. 
2. Future studies should be performed to develop empirical and prob-
abilistic methods for those phases of the risk analysis procedure 
which now depend on judgment decisions. Some examples of the most 
promising areas for study are: 
a. Probabilistic methods involving differential settlement 
b. Methods for evaluating core cracking and piping in dam 
embankments 
c. Human behavioral studies dealing with human error. 
3. During future research studies, those elements of the risk analysis 
procedure which are determined to be significant with regard to 
their potential contribution to the probability of failure and 
ultimate consequences, should be omitted from the procedure. A 
possib Ie criterion for deciding whether or not elements can be 
ignored by comparing their probability of occurrence with the 
probability of occurrence of natural phenomena. 
4. After further research and development work has been successfully 
completed, the risk analysis procedure should be made accessible 
to the practicing engineer by incorporating the entire procedure 
into an user-oriented interactive computer program. The program 
would require the user to select the method for estimating the 
transition probabilities and these estimates would be made in 
subroutines to the main program using user-supplied input. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 3. Soldier Creek Dam - chronological listing of information 
collected from WRPS in December 1979. 
DATE TITLE 
Feb. 1948 Reconnaissance Geological Report 
June 3, 1958 Inflow Design Flood Study 
June 3, 1958 Memo: Design Storms for Soldier Creek Dam 
Aug. 14, 1958 Memo: Review of Inflow Design Flood 
Sep. 11, 1958 Memo: Inflow Design Flood Study for Soldier Creek nam 
Sep. 1961 Lab Report: Earth Mtls. Investigation Lab Test "Results 
Aug. 1964 Definite plan Report 
Dec. 2, 1964 Lab. Tests on Proposed Embankment Mtls. for Final 
Design 
Jan. 1965 Geology Report No. G-210 
Jan. 1965 Preconstruction Earth Mtls. Exploration Report GM-81 
July 1965 Information Requested for Preparation of Specification 
Designs and Estimates, D & E No. 171 
1967 1968 Embankment Stability Calculations (Fel1inius - May 
Solut ions) 
Apr. 15, 1968 Memo: Discussion of Machine Control Parameters for 
Stability Analysis by F. M. Method Using CDC-6400 
May 2, 1968 Memo: Foundation Exploration 
--
Mar. 25, 1969 Spillway and Outlet Works, Design Summary 
1969 Specifications/Computations 
June 3, 1970 Construction Materials Test Data Spec. No. nC-6854 
-----------•. ~----
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Table 3. Continued. 
DATE TITLE 
July 1970 Design Consideration 
Dec. 22, 1972 Memo: Seismic Monitoring of Soldier Creek Reservoir 
1972 Earthwork Field & Lab Testing with Summaries 
Mar. 1973 Record of Foundation and Tunnel Grouting 
Aug. 12, 1974 Memo: Riprap Report 
Aug. 1974 Construction Engineering Geology Report Rpt. # G-295 
Approx. 1974 Final Construction Report 
June 10, 1975 Project Accretion Flow Studies (Feature: Rank Stora~e & 
Seepage) 
June 29, 1976 Reservoir Water-Holding Capability 
Apr. 4, 1977 Flood Hydrology Summary 
May 10, 1977 Memo: Inspection of Earth Embankment and Foundation 
June 1, 1977 Memo: Earthquake Evaluation 
June 1977 Wahler Report 
July 6, 1977 Memo: Riprap Repair 
Dec. 3, 1977 Faxogram: Subject: Technical Paragraph for Abutment 
Drilling 
May 4, 1978 Inspection Report 
May 10, 1978 Inspection Report 
Dec. 7, 1978 Memo: Water Samples 
1978 Placement of Riprap 
July 18, 1919 Memo: Water Samples 
NO DATE Standing Operating Procedures 
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Table 4. Soldier Creek Dam - project activity sequence description. 
1. Reconnaissance Geology Report (1948) 
Preliminary Report: 
No exploration has been done for construction at this point. 
Material that seemed to be available by inspection was looked at. 
Conclusions: 
Foundation materials seemed to be adequate. 
Further investigation will be needed for materials. 
2. Inflow Design Flood Study (1958) 
Relatively detailed study was conducted with virtually all 
contributing factors being taken into account. (i.e. aqueduct, 
frequency study, diversion requirements). 
Conclusions: 
Agree with a preliminary design flood study which was 
conducted July 16, 1948. 
Two alternative inflow design floods were presented: 
a) Maximum probable snowmelt and mod~rate frequency 
rain. 
b) Record snowmelt and maximum probable rain. 
3. Earth Materials Laboratory Report (1961) 
This report still seemed reconnaissance oriented. Location and 
description of borrow areas A-E was given. Descriptions and 
results of borrow material tests were supplied. 
Summary and Conclusions: 
Required material volume estimates were given. 
Availability estimates such as the type of materials 
pervious or impervious) for each borrow area were given. 
There were also some groundwater descriptions given. 
4. Laboratory Tests on Materials Proposed for "Final Design" Oc)64) 
This involved a relatively detailed testing program 
(gradation, Atterberg limits, compaction, placement, 
consolidation, shear values, etc.). 
Pre-construction test results were also shown. 
5. Summary of All Earth Materials Investigation Between 1C)48-65 
Concluded that 3 million cubic yards of earth material would 
be required. 
Eleven borrow areas were investigated in detail: 
Investigation outlined "sufficient" materials for the 
construction of the dam. 
Location and availability of the following was evaluated: 
Concrete aggregates, riprap, lumber and mine timbers, 
gravel road materials. 
Geology Report No. G-210 (1965) 
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Table 4. Continued. 
5. Relatively detailed report which investigated: 
(cont.) Regional geology, damsitegeo10gy, construction materials. 
Site conditions and earth materials investigations were 
conducted using many borings. 
Summary and Conclusions: 
Soldier Creek Damsite is one of the best sites, if not the 
best, left for water storage in Utah. 
This conclusion is based on the geology, nearby avail-
ability of construction materials and overall design 
requirements as a result of the site conditions. 
6. Stability Calculations: (1967-68) 
Calculations were performed using the Fe11enius-~ay s01ution on 
the following maximum section: 
5 zones (middle zone was core with toe drain) 
2 foundation layers. 
7. Stability Calculations were still being made 
Memo from Chief Engineer concerning foundation exploration: (lQ6~) 
Location and depth of 8 drill holes were reouested to 
facilitate additional exploration for foundation. 
Locations of 2 exploration lines (A and B) were reQuested for 
profiles and geologic descriptions. 
8. Design Summary of Spillway and Outlet Works (1969) 
Recommendations as a result of this study were: 
a) Adopt single stage construction 
b) Adopt two level outlet works without spillway 
<initially approved December 12, 1967) 
c) Adopt flip bucket with a limited stilling capacity. 
d) Remove alluvial fan in mouth of side drainage draw to 
expose sound rock but do not provide excavated channel 
for side drainage. This assumes adoption of recommen-
dation c). 
e) Gate aeration is recommended only if design can be model 
tested to establish satifactory performance. (Branch 
Chief rejected proposed test at $10,000) 
Addendum (April 1970) 
Provisions for selective level withdrawals for protection of 
game fish. (Estimated cost increase $200,000). 
Selective level provisions with modified vertical shaft intake 
was recommended. 
9. Construction Materials Test Data (1970) 
No specific summaries were given. 
Test results were given on: 
Concrete aggregate, riprap, soil test data (nenver Lab .. 
Field Lab., Borrow Areas A-G). 
Table 4. Continued. 
10. Earthwork Field and Lab. Testing with Summaries (1972) 
Construction has begun 
Embankment testing and monitoring of in-place soil properties 
is included with references to the locations of each sample 
on the embankment with reference to its borrow origin. 
Memo Dealing with Seismic Monitoring of Soldier Creek Reservoir 
1972) 
This memo was an attempt to negotiate a program to monitor the 
earthquake potent ial with respect to the fillin~ of Soldier 
Creek Reservoir. It still seemed to be pending due to funding 
complications although the Bureau seemed to be much in favor. 
11. Record of Foundation and Tunnel Grouting (1973) 
Location and extent of grouting was indicated. 
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Quantity, quality, and pressure of applied grout was also given 
here. 
12. Construction Engineering Geology Report (1974) 
The following information was given with respect to the 
construction of Solider Creek Dam as related to: 
Damsite, grouting, outlet works, access shaft, and 
stilling basin, construction embankment materials. 
13. Bank Storage and Seepage 
Reservoir Water - Holding Capability (1976) 
14. Flood Hydrology Summary (1977) 
Summaries were included in the areas of: 
Flood types, design storm, unit hydrographs, moderate 
snowflood, maximum snowflood, combined design floods, 
diversion frequency study, and historical floods. 
Memo regarding earthquake evaluation was submitted: (1977) 
Relatively detailed report for the purpose of evaluating 
operating basic earthquake, design basic earthquake, maximum 
credible earthquake, and the recurrence interval for two 
seismotectonic provinces they called Basin and Range and Rocky 
Mountain - Colorado Plateau. 
Memo Regarding Inspection of Earth Embankment and Foundation 
0977>. 
Tables were compiled showing the following information for a 
given day: 
Elevation reservoir, time and amount (gpm) for the right 
and left abutments, seepage respectively. 
Memo regarding the drilling of observation holes in the abutments. 
Information as to the requested well depth, location. and 
nearest drill hole number were given. 
Table 4. Continued. 
15. Seepage Inspect ion of Abutments (1978) 
Regular readings have been taken at certain intervals and it 
seems they will continue to be taken in future. 
Water Samples (1978) 
Information of water samples taken also at a regular basis. 
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